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‘The Cuban Question’ and the Cold War in Latin America, 1959-1964. 
 
Tanya Harmer 
 
In January 1962, Latin American foreign ministers and U.S. Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk arrived at the Uruguayan beach resort of Punta del Este to debate Cuba’s 
position in the Western Hemisphere. Unsurprisingly for a group of representatives 
from 21 different states with varying political, socio-economic, and geographic 
contexts, they had divergent goals. Yet, with the exception of Cuba’s delegation, they 
all agreed on why they were there: Havana’s alignment with “extra-continental 
communist powers” along with Fidel Castro’s announcement that he was a life-long 
Marxist-Leninist on 1 December 1961 had made Cuba’s government “incompatible 
with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.” A Communist 
offensive in Latin America of “increased intensity” also meant “continental unity and 
the democratic institutions of the hemisphere” were “in danger.”1  
After agreeing on these points, the assembled officials had to decide what to 
do about it. Divisions immediately surfaced on this matter. Ultimately, delegates at 
Punta del Este voted by two-thirds to exclude Cuba’s revolutionary government from 
the Organization of American States (OAS) with six nations abstaining. The foreign 
ministers also agreed to an arms embargo, to suspend Cuba from the Inter-American 
Defense Board, to examine the possibility of further trade restrictions through the 
OAS Council, and to establish a Special Consultative Committee on Security.2 
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However, protracted disputes about Cuba’s revolutionary government’s position in 
Latin America and what to do about it–la cuestión cubana or “the Cuban question” as 
it was known at the time–would continue, dominating regional politics throughout the 
early 1960s. As host of the Punta del Este meeting, Uruguayan Foreign Minister, 
Homero Martínez Montero, reflected that “no other event” in the twentieth century 
had shaken the region and disturbed the established order in the hemisphere to the 
same extent as the Cuban Revolution.3 
The 1962 Punta del Este meeting raises two important issues.  First, the 
unanimity with which delegates regarded Cuba’s position in the Western Hemisphere 
is striking. We tend to think of the Cuban Revolution as polarizing opinion in Latin 
America and feeding into Cold War divides. The scholarship that exists on Punta del 
Este also emphasizes differences among delegates at the meeting–particularly 
between the United States and the six Latin American governments that abstained on 
the Cuban government’s suspension from the OAS.4 Yet, by early 1962 all regional 
governments subscribed to the view that Cuba’s revolutionary regime was directly at 
odds with inter-American system. The question is why and what this tells us about the 
history of the Cold War in Latin America.  
Second, we need to know more about Latin American disagreements when it 
came to what the inter-American system should do about this “incompatibility.” In 
this respect, it is important to read the Punta del Este meeting as part of a longer 
dynamic process that began with the Cuban Revolution and ultimately led to an OAS 
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majority voting for collective sanctions in July 1964. Three major inter-American 
conferences were convened to deal with the Cuban Question during this period: the 
Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in San José, Costa Rica 
(September 1960), the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers in Punta 
del Este (January 1962), and the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers 
in Washington DC (July 1964). Inter-American meetings before, during, and 
following the Cuban missile crisis also served as forums for debates on Cuba. 
Together, these diplomatic encounters offer windows through which to grapple with 
the evolution of the Cuban Question in the inter-American system, with the emphasis 
here being the contested move to exclude Cuba’s government from the OAS and then 
the difficult road to imposing collective sanctions against it.  
Given the impact of the Cuban Revolution on Latin American governments 
and the inter-American system in the early 1960s, it is surprising that Cuba’s 
relationship with the region has received little attention from international historians. 
Scholarship on Cuba’s international relations since 1959 has focused mainly on U.S. 
responses to the Revolution.5 We also know quite a bit about Cuba’s foreign policy 
goals and support for revolutionary movements.6 But how Latin American 
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governments and diplomats reacted to the Revolution and what they did about it is far 
less clear. To some extent this is because diplomatic archives in the region have only 
recently opened. But it is also to do with a strong narrative spread by the left–
promoted effusively by Castro–that explained inter-American sanctions against Cuba 
as being forced on Latin America by the United States with the OAS acting as a 
“Ministry of Yankee Colonies.”7 Historians who have exclusively consulted 
declassified U.S. documents would also be forgiven for thinking that Washington 
masterminded the region’s response to the Cuban Revolution.8 This was certainly 
how U.S. government officials privately represented their interactions with regional 
counterparts. They saw themselves teaching Latin Americans to understand Cuba’s 
threat, expending enormous efforts managing the “noise-level” of information on 
Cuba through hemispheric media outlets. When U.S. officials spoke about the OAS, 
they referred to it as instrument of foreign policy, discussing “the action against Cuba 
we want the OAS to take.”9 They also fed information to regional governments and 
supported them in pushing OAS resolutions against Cuba.10 U.S. documents can often 
give the impression that the Latin Americans passively awaited instructions. Adoption 
of a United States vs. Latin America binary account of the Cuban question can also be 
tempting. 
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Important as the U.S.’s role was, the problem with this narrative is that the 
Cuban Revolution elicited strong reactions in Latin American corridors of power as 
well. Regional governments did not need to be fed stories about Castro to the extent 
U.S. policymakers believed, nor did their diplomats need coaching in anti-
Communism to be alarmed by the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution or its 
relations with the Soviet Union with alarm, although U.S. efforts to raise the “noise 
level” undoubtedly helped. Rooted in Catholicism, the military, and elites’ fear of 
hierarchical power structures being uprooted anti-Communism had a long internal 
history in Latin America prior to the Cuban revolution.11 Communist parties were 
banned in eight countries by 1948 and all but three of fifteen states that had 
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union before or during World War II 
had broken off ties by the mid-1950s.12 Declassified Latin American documents show 
that this longer tradition of anti-Communism in turn fed into interpretations over 
Cuba. Even those governments that held out on imposing sanctions, and were 
perceived by Washington as “soft,” moderate, or “trying to sit on the fence” when it 
came to the Cuban Question, privately condemned Castro’s revolutionary regime.13 
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At least from early 1960 onward, no government in Latin America sympathized with 
Castro. Leaders in the region often deferred to the United States, shared similar 
concerns about the Cuban Revolution with U.S officials, and were also influenced by 
U.S. actions. But not all conversations regarding anti-Communism and Cuba were 
routed through Washington.  
The story of the Cuban question in Latin America fits within a historiography 
that emphasizes the importance of decentralizing Cold War narratives and recovering 
Latin American agency.14 As Odd Arne Westad argued in 2005, we need to pay closer 
attention to ideas and protagonists in Latin America, Asia and Africa to get a sense of 
the conflict’s global dimensions.15 And, to this end, historians like Renata Keller, 
Robert Karl, Eric Zolov, James Hershberg, Aragorn Storm Miller, Thomas Field, and 
Jonathan Brown have recently begun to shed light on the way in which the Cuban 
revolution was construed in Latin America. Hershberg has tracked Brazilian attitudes 
to Cuba and Brasilia’s mediation in U.S.-Cuban conflicts of the early 1960s. Keller, 
Karl, Zolov, Field, and Brown have also emphasized the domestic implications that 
Cuba had and the way in which regional actors interpreted the Cuban question 
“through the lenses of their own local conflicts.”16 More than three decades ago, the 
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Chilean historian, Joaquín Fermandois concretely examined Chile’s interaction with 
the Cuban Question drawing on the Chilean press and congressional records, and in 
my own work I have also examined Cuba’s influence on the left in Chile.17 
Despite the important literature that has already appeared, a great deal remains 
to be learned. In particular, we need to know more about the influence the Cuban 
Revolution had on inter-American relations and institutions. The aim of this article is 
not to contribute another nationally- or bilaterally- framed study of Cuba’s impact but 
to begin piecing together a regional picture of diplomacy surrounding the Cuba 
question. The article builds on the valuable research that Fermandois, Keller, 
Hershberg, Karl, and Field have already undertaken on Chile, Mexico, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Bolivia’s relationship to Cuba respectively, adding new perspectives 
from my own research in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Mexico in addition to 
declassified sources from online U.S. collections. Such an approach has obvious  
drawbacks. For one thing, it is impossible in one article to examine all diplomatic and 
state-level discussions regarding la cuestión cubana throughout the Americas over a 
five-year period and in my analysis here I d not pretend to provide a full picture of all 
Latin American governmental perspectives on the crisis. Second, I have not had 
access to all the diplomatic archives in the Americas, and the coverage of those I have 
consulted has been problematic. Tranches of documents one would expect to find in a 
foreign ministry archive, such as regular correspondence from the Argentine embassy 
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in Washington, are reportedly “missing,” and more often than not, diplomatic cables 
from the field are far more extensively available than records of internal 
governmental meetings making it hard to discern the way that diplomats’ reports were 
processed.  
Based on what is currently available, however, this is an initial opportunity to 
take a broader, inter-American view of the Cuban revolution’s diplomatic impact and 
its significance for the inter-American system. Diplomatic sources from four Latin 
American countries, in addition to existing scholarship and declassified U.S. sources, 
can also provide insight into patterns and views that existed in the hemisphere beyond 
the selected countries that this article zooms in on. We can already begin discerning 
the main turning points, fault-lines, and frameworks used within Latin America to 
interpret the Cuban revolution, as well as how they helped shape, and were shaped by, 
the Cold War in the region.  
Rather than zooming in on countries that advocated a straightforward hardline 
position against Cuba from 1959, such as those in Central America governed by 
dictatorships, this article pays particular attention to countries that were democratic in 
the early 1960s and that opposed a hardline stance against Cuba in inter-American 
forums such as Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, and also Mexico’s nationalist 
revolutionary one-party state.  To be sure democracy did not endure in these 
countries. Brazil and Argentina had three different governments each in the period 
between 1959 and 1964, with the democratically elected reformist governments of 
Jaino Quadros and Arturo Frondizi falling in 1961 and 1962 at least in part as a result 
of domestic military opposition to both leaders’ moderate position on the Cuban 
Question.18 Together, however, the more complex perspectives offered by the 
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Chilean, Uruguayan, Brazilian, Argentinean, and Mexican diplomatic histories can 
help us to grasp the differences that existed vis-à-vis the Cuban Question in Latin 
America. Collectively, these perspectives illustrate that resistance to sanctions did not 
imply sympathy and support for Cuba’s revolution and that even those opposing them 
were Cold Warriors when it came to resisting Communism in the hemisphere.  
The picture that emerges is of a region’s leaders more united than divided over 
Cuba’s significance. Far right dictators, conservative democrats, nationalist 
revolutionaries, and centrist reformers were bound together by a shared anti-
Communism that put them directly at odds with Havana’s leaders. With Cuba 
magnifying the Communist threat in the region, conceptualizations of the Cold War in 
the region also changed. Although anti-Communism had been prominent in the region 
for decades, many now spoke about Cuba having brought the “iron curtain” to Latin 
America.19 Some Latin American leaders increasingly saw themselves and the inter-
American system as a whole, as part of a global Cold War in the early 1960s directly 
as a result of the Cuban question. Uruguay’s Martínez Montero, who hosted the Punta 
del Este meeting in 1962, for example, wrote that Latin America had become 
enmeshed in “constant tensions and clashes between those who defend freedom and 
democracy and those who seek to supplant them with a totalitarian communist 
political conception.” Until now, “these calamities had not been felt” in Latin 
America, he added, but Cuba had changed that.20 Or as Frondizi’s Foreign Minister 
put it, “Communism has arrived in our America.”21 U.S. policymakers in the 1960s–
as well as historians–have all too often underestimated Latin American governments 
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and their diplomatic representatives’ own ability to interpret the Cuban revolution as a 
Cold War threat. 
On the question of what to do about Cuba, the picture is more complicated. 
The states that resisted sanctions did so for four main reasons. First, they were 
constrained in acting more openly against Cuba due to domestic pressure from non-
governmental political actors who sympathized with the Cuban Revolution or actively 
supported it. Second, they did not agree that the inter-American system’s post-war 
institutions and collective security agreements mandated punitive actions against 
Cuba. The principle of non-intervention at the heart of the inter-American system, in 
place mainly to contain the United States, was still considered sacrosanct. Third, they 
argued that sanctions would be ineffective and counterproductive. Finally, they 
worried about the precedent that intervention against Cuba would set. They were 
meanwhile disdainful of extreme regional anti-Communists who sought aggressive 
action against Cuba. Furthermore, they often regarded their U.S. interlocutors as more 
rational hemispheric players. On the other side of the sanctions argument, particularly 
in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, extreme anti-Cuban lobbyists bemoaned what 
they perceived as lackluster U.S. action against Castro. Latin Americans did not 
therefore line up neatly against or for the United States; inter-American disagreements 
were multisided rather than binary. Only by paying attention to perspectives from 
within the region can we appreciate the complexity that U.S. policymakers often 
missed in their simplistic belief they had to instruct their regional counterparts how to 
think and act. 
 
Shared Concerns 
 11 
Before Latin America’s Foreign Ministers met at Punta del Este, diplomats 
throughout the region had already come to view the Cuban revolution with concern. 
When Castro gained power on 1 January 1959, he was widely regarded as nationalist, 
anti-dictatorial, and anti-Communist. However, opinions rapidly changed, with 
diplomatic observers in the Americas concluding by late 1959 or early 1960 that first 
impressions had been misguided. There are several reasons for this change of heart, 
including the radicalization of the Revolution inside Cuba, the growing influence of 
Communism on the island, its alignment with the Soviet Union, and Havana’s support 
for revolutionary insurgencies in the region. Although left-wing groups in Latin 
America celebrated these developments, elites inside and outside the government, 
democrats, religious groups, members of the armed forces, and business sectors were 
increasingly worried. Disenchantment with Cuba was also closely related to how 
diplomats conceptualized Latin America, its vulnerabilities, and their own domestic 
political contexts.  
At a meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers in Santiago in August 1959, Cuba’s 
new revolutionary government had committed itself to respect representative 
democracy and human rights but the evidence available to observers suggested 
otherwise. In particular, the new Cuban government’s reluctance to hold elections and 
its revolutionary tribunals drew criticism from regional observers.22 We tend to 
associate this kind of condemnation with the United States, but Latin Americans were 
also outspoken. As Hershberg has found, Brazil’s ambassador in Havana, Vasco 
Tristão Leitão da Cunha, an early admirer of Castro, had been one of the first 
diplomats to try and stop summary executions days after Castro came to power.23 
While resisting open condemnation of such practices on the grounds of non-
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intervention, the Mexican government also instructed its ambassador in Havana to 
talk privately with Cuba’s foreign minister and explain the negative effect the 
executions were having on public opinion in Mexico.24 Admittedly, the complaints 
against revolutionary trials could also be farcical, such as Central American and 
Caribbean dictators denounced Cuba for being un-democratic and violating human 
rights. However, it would be a mistake to dismiss all concerns with Cuban policies as 
the preserve of anti-Communist dictators. Already in April 1959, previously 
sympathetic Colombian journalists were warning of “The Danger of Excesses” in 
Cuba.25 A year later, one Chilean diplomat stationed in Havana–representing 
President Jorge Alessandri’s democratically elected conservative government–
reported on “hundreds of executions by firing squads (nearly a thousand according to 
the foreign press) carried out by a dreadful sadistic apparatus [designed] to produce 
calculated terror and the sensation of . . . naked revenge.” Castro was a “shrewd, 
vicious, inflexible,” he added; “men in the street are tremendously fearful and keep 
quiet about the negative aspects of the regime.”26 Such reports would have chimed 
with Alessandri and much of Chile’s domestic political elite who had come to similar 
conclusions based on news of the trials that circulated widely in the country.27  
Castro’s revolutionary tribunals were only part of the picture. What made 
Cuba different in a region familiar with repressive dictatorships was the increasingly 
prominent role of Communists in government. As Hershberg argues, Brazil’s 
democratically elected nationalist president, Juscelino Kubitschek, told the U.S. 
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ambassador in Brazil in January 1960 that he was “thoroughly disgusted with what 
was going on in Cuba” and believed that Raul Castro “was certainly a commie and 
that Cuba was disturbing the whole Caribbean.”28 Drawing attention to the growing 
influence of Communists in Cuba in March 1960, the first secretary at the Chilean 
Embassy in Havana meanwhile reported that Fidel Castro’s “thought, in one way or 
another, coincides with [Josip Broz] Tito, [Wladyslaw] Gomulka, or Mao Zedong. He 
has a clear concept of . . . socialism . . . It is a totalitarianism without a name.”29 By 
July 1960, Argentina’s ambassador in Havana, Julio Amoedo–representing Frondizi’s 
democratic government–similarly observed that Castro was “practically controlled by 
Communists.”30  
Seeking to explain this growing Communist influence, Chilean diplomats, in 
particular, demonstrated the sort of crudeness and racism towards Cuba that we more 
commonly associate with U.S. policymakers’ attitudes.31 Rather than exploring the 
historical appeal of Communism stretching back to the 1920s and 1930s in Cuba, for 
example, Emilio Edwards Bello, Chile’s ambassador, belonging to one of Chile’s 
most influential and elitist families, ascribed its influence to the island’s late 
independence. “While Latin America is born, historically, in the era of the French 
Revolution,” he reported, “Cuba emerges at the time of Lenin’s revolution.”32 
Another Chilean diplomat singled Castro out as “extraordinarily intelligent . . . 
compared to the people in his geographic area.”33 Similarly, the ambassador explained 
his appeal by pointing to the Cubans’ inferior “culture” and “capacity,” which made 
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them susceptible to the regime’s “hypnosis.” With many white members of Cuban 
society leaving the island after the Revolution, Edwards Bello also reported “the 
island already looks . . . blacker.” He warned that “Cuba is heading in the direction of 
Haíti,” evoking the eighteenth-century slave revolt and the fear it inspired across the 
Americas.34   
Alongside these Chilean prejudices, Latin American diplomats were 
increasingly concerned with Cuba’s international alignments. With the U.S.-Cuban 
relationship deteriorating in 1960, Castro’s ties to the Soviet Union loomed large.35 
Diplomats from Brazil and Argentina henceforth engaged in mediation to improve 
relations between Havana and Washington, and the Mexican government also offered 
to facilitate dialogue.36 Latin American diplomats from these countries calculated that 
if further conflict could be avoided, Cuba’s position in the hemisphere and its 
relationship with the USSR, could be managed. At least as far as the Chilean Foreign 
Ministry was concerned, U.S.-Cuban hostility was helping Cuba to mobilize support 
and boosting anti-U.S. sectors in the region. Chile’s domestic Cuban problem would 
“disappear” if U.S.-Cuban relations improved.37 
However, by July 1960, the mediation efforts had stalled. Even as U.S.-Cuban 
relations broke down decisively, Soviet ties to Cuba increased when the USSR 
offered to purchase the island’s sugar and invest heavily in its economic development. 
Latin America’s diplomats kept a close eye on Cuba’s evolving relationship with the 
Soviet bloc. As an Argentine note passed to the Cubans on 13 July underlined, 
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Frondizi’s government was “seriously concerned” about “threats made by an extra-
continental state” and the possibility of its “intervention in hemispheric affairs.”38 In 
the context of Cuba’s growing economic and military ties with the Soviet Union, 
Chile’s ambassador meanwhile reflected Cuba now had two “orbits:” the West’s and 
the Communists’. It only remained in the inter-American system to “hide its position 
as a Russian satellite,” he added.39 Mexico’s ambassador in Havana, Giliberto 
Bosques, similarly reported the same month that “eagerness for exchange between 
Cuba and socialist countries” seemed destined for “a complete identification of 
economic, political, and social systems.” He also noted 300 campesinos had arrived 
from the Soviet Union to advise on agrarian development. These specialists, he said, 
encountered language problems and the Cubans would have preferred Latin American 
specialists. But regional governments had not shown the same “enthusiasm” for 
helping Havana’s new leaders.40 The Chilean ambassador was more ominous. Soviet 
campesinos looked like “soldiers” and were staying in the prestigious Habana Libre 
hotel, he warned, implying an ulterior military purpose on the island.41 
In many ways, the Cuban Revolution made the Soviet Union more visible in 
Latin America than it had been before. As Edwards Bello reflected, Cuba allowed 
Latin Americans in the capital to watch the Soviets closely, providing “a kind of 
observation tower” for “Russia, [countries behind] the Iron Curtain, and other 
satellites (Vietnam, North Korea etc.).” Based on these observations, he argued that 
Cuba demonstrated that the Soviet bloc’s “myth of progress” was false and that its 
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production was “scarce and inferior, qualitatively and technically” to the United 
States’.42 
Had the Cuban revolution and its association with the Soviet bloc been 
confined to Cuba, Latin American governments may have been prepared to watch 
from a distance. However, very soon after 1959, the revolution’s outward looking 
nature and its potential to mobilize revolutionary fervor abroad caused alarm. After 
all, no government–in Latin America or elsewhere in the world–wanted (and wants) 
to be overthrown. In 1959, Cuba’s revolutionary regime supported anti-dictatorial 
insurgencies in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, while in Panama, Cubans, 
without the apparent backing of their government, participated in an insurrection 
against the government.43 Latin American diplomats also quickly perceived Soviet 
presence in Latin America to be growing thanks to Cuba. As diplomats in Santiago 
noted, the region had not been a priority for the Soviet Union before 1959 even if 
Moscow had been ready to seize any opportunity “in the name of world revolution.”44 
Cuba had then provided that opportunity. With it, concerns over Soviet goals grew. 
Brazil’s Ambassador Leitão de Cunha told a U.S. official in late 1960 that he was  
 
extremely concerned over Cuban Government’s acquisition of huge stores of 
arms which he is convinced are destined for Castro-type extremist groups 
throughout Latin America. He expressed opinion entire continent is facing 
grave hour and that action must be taken very quickly to remove danger posed 
by Castro.45  
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Diplomatic sources also suggest Latin American governments paid growing attention 
to Soviet propaganda in the region. In late 1960, Amoedo warned that, according to 
“confidential sources,” “communist propaganda” was being sent from Cuba to 
Argentina via Montevideo.46 Around this time, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry also 
ordered all its diplomats to report on Communist influence in host countries. From 
Santiago, Argentina’s ambassador responded unequivocally: Latin American 
diplomats in the city were reporting that Cuba acted “synchronously with Russia” and 
that close political and commercial relations between them facilitated “communist 
work in [Latin] America more every day.”47 Edwards Bello meanwhile warned 
Santiago that the Soviet Embassy in Havana was using Cuban publishers to print “a 
mountain” of subversive materials destined for Latin America.48 According to the 
Chilean Foreign Ministry, Cuba had revealed the “real threat posed by Soviet 
intervention in the hemisphere.”49  
Latin American governments considered the region to be particularly 
susceptible to Cuban and Soviet influence in the early 1960s because of its poverty. 
The Argentine Chargé d’Affaires in Tegucigalpa warned Buenos Aires in early 1960 
that “Communist penetration” was growing “every day” in Honduras as a result of the 
country’s standard of living.50 In conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Christian 
Herter in August 1960, Argentina’s Foreign Minister Diagones Taboada pressed a 
similar point. Economics and underdevelopment were intricately linked to “political 
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instability,” he argued.51 The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research understood these sentiments well: “increasing misery and discontent among 
the mass of Latin American people will provide opportunities for pro-Castro elements 
to act,” its analysts concluded.52 
The fear among governments in the region that the Cuban Revolution could 
mobilize left-wing opposition and/or support revolutionary insurgencies inside their 
own countries made it an “internal problem” as much as an external one.53 Rightwing 
dictators tried to control the effect that Cuba’s revolution had on their opponents’ 
increasing militancy through repression and militarized counter-insurgency. However, 
nationalist and democratic governments like those in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela were more constrained. Although 
repressive tactics were used at times against left-wing opponents in these countries, 
authorities also tried to ameliorate criticism by implementing reforms (or at least 
paying lip service to them) as promoted by the Alliance for Progress, and adopting a 
more moderate stance on Cuba. As Keller has suggested, these countries were forced 
to take, “a more ambiguous approach to avoid alienating significant sectors of the 
population.”54 This was the stance adopted by Mexico and Bolivia, where Cuba’s 
revolutionary example challenged the legitimacy of states founded on their own 
revolutions. As President Adolfo López Mateos told the Director of the U.S. Central 
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Intelligence Agency in January 1961, his country could not openly oppose Castro or 
take any direct action against it on account of the Mexican left’s support for Havana’s 
revolutionary leaders.55 As Field argues, Bolivia’s nationalist President Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro similarly believed he could only resist pressure from left-wing opponents–
and Cuba’s support for them–by refusing to break relations with Castro.56 Chile’s 
Eduardo Frei, the reformist Christian Democratic senator and presidential candidate in 
1964 campaigning against a left-wing coalition that included Communists and 
Socialists, also confided that advocating sanctions against Cuba could cost him 
100,000 votes.57 And Chile’s conservative President Jorge Alessandri, conscious of 
critics to the left and the right, repeatedly insisted he did not want the Cuban issue to 
exacerbate divisions in Chile.58  
Elected Latin American governments also had to respond to the right and the 
military within their own countries by proving they were dealing with the problem of 
Communism effectively. Just as he faced pro-Castro protests and mobilization, 
Alessandri faced sharp criticism in the National Congress for what conservative 
senators insisted was a lack of sufficient anti-Communism when it came to dealing 
with Cuba.59 When Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa visited Caracas in March 1960, 
for example, students, workers, the Communist Party of Venezuela, and the media 
enthusiastically welcomed him. However, others in the country–above all people from 
banking, industry, and commerce–voiced their disquiet. As the Chilean ambassador in 
Caracas reported, Venezuela confronted a “serious internal crisis” over Cuba.60 In 
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Colombia, which had just emerged from a decade of violence and internal conflict, 
conservative sectors targeted the country’s new democratically elected President, 
Alberto Lleras, as a result of the “momentous proportions” the Cuban question gained 
during 1960.61 Argentina’s President Frondizi and Brazil’s President Quadros 
likewise faced significant pressure from their country’s armed forces to take a more 
hardline position against Cuba.62  
This was the context in which inter-American foreign ministers approached 
the first major meeting to deal with the Cuban Question in September 1960 in San 
José. Delegates denounced Communism’s growing influence in the hemisphere and 
the “intervention or the threat of intervention by an extra-continental power.”63 As 
Argentina’s Diagónes Taboada proclaimed, “from other continents they want to 
introduce ideologies, institutions and regimes . . . into American countries which are 
absolutely contrary to our idiosyncrasy, our tradition, our form of life, our reciprocal 
interests and our most rooted ideals.”64 But at least partly for domestic political 
reasons, they also refused to name Cuba or recommend further action against its 
revolutionary regime. 
Castro was enraged by what he saw as a surge of regional hostility to Cuba, 
and he now issued what became known as the First Declaration of Havana, 
denouncing the San José Declaration as being “dictated by North American 
imperialism.”65 To some extent he was right to point the finger at the United States. 
The Eisenhower administration was instrumental in calling the meeting and pushing 
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for condemnation of Cuba.66 However, many Latin American diplomats–including 
those that represented the so-called moderate group of regional states resisting more 
hardline action against Cuba – harbored concerns prior to the meeting that were 
similar to those of their U.S. counterparts. By late 1960, the Cuban revolution was 
already isolated informally, and even formally, within the hemisphere. True, it could 
count on strong support from leftwing parties, trade unions, and students in Latin 
America, many of whom were prepared to go out onto the streets to express their 
solidarity with the Revolution and who put considerable pressure on democratic 
governments not to oppose Cuba.67 Others, mostly in Central America and the 
Caribbean, took up arms and vowed to overthrow their governments by force of arms 
following Cuba’s example.68 On the other side of the Cold War divide, stood a 
growing state-led consensus among governments and diplomats of many different 
political persuasions that Cuba–and the growing Communist and Soviet influence it 
brought to the region–was a cause for significant concern. By 1960, at least on the 
regional level, the fault-lines of the Cold War did not run between countries but 
between anti-communist governments on the one side and groups of their citizens 
who sympathized with, or actively supported, Havana’s revolutionary leaders on the 
other. The situation in Venezuela grew particularly acute in this regard from October 
1960, with the development of a Cuban-inspired revolutionary insurgency that 
received Havana’s support in the form of training at least from 1962.69 As well as 
breaking diplomatic relations with Havana and adopting a militarized counter-
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insurgency campaign, President Romulo Betancourt, leader of the centrist reformist 
party, Acción Democrática, henceforth also adopted an increasingly hardline anti-
Cuban position in hemispheric forums demanding action against Havana. The 
question that the inter-American system had to face was whether to turn shared 
governmental concern into collective action. 
 
“Incompatibility” 
The Cuban Question was considered a regional problem for two key reasons: the 
security challenge Cuba’s revolutionary regime was believed to pose and the impact 
hemispheric disagreements about it had for the validity of the postwar inter-American 
system. It did not help matters that the United States was regarded as not 
communicating its own position effectively. As the Uruguayan ambassador in 
Washington warned after the Bay of Pigs, the lack of U.S.-Latin America consultation 
over the crisis had threatened the legitimacy of the Western Hemisphere’s 
institutional architecture.70  
The inter-American system rested on the regional framework established after 
World War II. Comprising the 1947 Treaty of Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance 
(TIAR or Rio Treaty) and the OAS, created in 1948, they committed the United States 
and Latin American states to collective defense of each other’s territory, non-
intervention, and regional governance. Member states had also agreed to a resolution 
on the “Preservation and Defense of Democracy in America” which labeled 
international Communism as “incompatible” with the inter-American system when 
they signed the OAS Charter in 1948. This anti-Communist pledge had subsequently 
been updated in 1954 at the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas. Following 
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a U.S. lead, governments in the Americas had resolved to “take the necessary 
measures to protect their political independence against the intervention of 
international Communism” and vowed that “the domination or control of the political 
institutions of any American state by the international Communist movement 
extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an extra-continental power, 
would constitute a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of the 
American States, endangering the peace of America.”71  
Without concrete proof of such a situation, Washington had failed to get 
support for collective action against Jacobo Arbenz’s democratically elected 
government in Guatemala on the basis of this Declaration but a CIA-sponsored coup 
d’état had toppled him the same year. After 1959, Cuba was then in the spotlight with 
the San José meeting having been the first effort to deal with it. However, the San 
José Declaration’s failure to name Cuba and recommend decisive action against 
Castro left many governments in the region unsatisfied. U.S. officials believed San 
José had fallen “considerably short” of desired objectives. Fearful of setting a 
precedent for intervention in Cuba’s internal affairs (and other Latin American states 
in the future), eight foreign ministers had spoken in favor of the right to self-
determination at the meeting. With implied reference to the United States, the 
Declaration of San José included renewed commitment to “non-intervention.”72  
The San José meeting had therefore placed the question of action against 
Cuba’s revolutionary government on hold. The meeting had also been convened 
under the OAS Charter and not the Rio Treaty, meaning it could only recommend 
measures to be taken. Under the Rio Treaty, a consultative meeting could be 
convoked to consider a threat to peace or armed attack against a member state and 
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would have the power to impose punitive measures against an aggressor. It was this 
latter mechanism that the United States and Latin American governments that 
ardently opposed Castro had subsequently begun pushing for in early 1961. Despite 
broadly shared concern in Latin America concerning Cuba’s trajectory, governments 
in Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia nevertheless resisted such a 
meeting. Until proof emerged of an armed Cuban attack on a Latin American state or 
a decisive threat to hemispheric peace, they preferred to deal with the situation in the 
OAS.73 Domestic politics also factored into their position. Aside from the legalities of 
a meeting under the TIAR, for example, the Chilean Foreign Ministry wanted to avoid 
the domestic political “complications” that could arise from a new “tribunal” on 
Cuba.74 However, U.S. analysts, seemingly unable to understand that opposition for 
further action did not mean sympathy for Havana’s leaders, worried that these 
countries were “still trying to sit on the fence.”75 
Even so, momentum for holding a second Meeting of Consultation built up 
towards the end of 1961. In October, Peru’s rightwing democratic government 
launched an initiative to invoke the Rio Treaty on the grounds of Cuba’s “Communist 
infiltration” in Latin America via “diplomatic functionaries and secret agents.”76 With 
this initiative having failed, Colombia’s government, facing left-wing insurgencies of 
its own and having broken relations with Havana as a result of evidence to suggest 
Cuban support for them, then succeeded in tabling a vote at the OAS in December.77 
In the interim, Cuba’s leaders tried to secure support from Latin American countries 
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that still had diplomats in Havana.78 Presumably having failed to get reassurances, 
and with the OAS vote days away, Castro suddenly announced he was a life-long 
Marxist-Leninist on 1 December. As Edwards Bello noted from Havana, observers 
were “extremely surprised” by the announcement, “not because they did not think he 
was a Marxist-Leninist,” but because of its timing. There was “no doubt” the move 
was “challenging and aggressive,” Edwards Bello concluded; Castro was “deeply 
disdainful of the OAS, and of Latin American diplomacy in general.”79 Days after the 
announcement, with Cuba’s political institutions now unequivocally controlled by a 
Marxist-Leninist, the OAS Council voted by a majority of fourteen to two (Cuba and 
Mexico), with five abstentions (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador), to 
convene a Meeting of Consultation on 22 January in Punta del Este.80 
For the Foreign Ministers who met in Uruguay, Castro’s announcement–
coming seven months after he had declared the Cuban Revolution socialist–confirmed 
the “incompatibility” of the island’s revolutionary regime with the inter-American 
system. The difference for many of those who had been reluctant to condemn Cuba 
explicitly at San José was that Castro had explicitly rejected Article 5 of the OAS 
charter, which stated members had to ascribe to “the effective exercise of 
representative democracy.”81 Although hardly a representative of liberal, pluralist 
democracy, Mexico’s Foreign Minister, Manuel Tello, recognized this was the “first 
time in the history of America” that a government “definitively declared it was 
assuming an ideology and political system totally extraneous to what has until now 
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been the common denominator of . . . the new world.” He admitted that other 
governments had rejected representative democracy, but none had ever openly opted 
for a “different political philosophy.”82 
Others echoed this position. Brazil’s Foreign Minister, Clementino de San 
Tiago Dantas, noted the absence of democratic governance did not imply “radical 
incompatibility,” but “the deliberate and permanent acceptance” of a confrontational 
political ideology was a problem.83 Uruguay’s Martínez Montero also privately 
reflected “a government that self-proclaims itself Marxist-Leninist and receives 
military assistance from the Sino-Soviet bloc has deliberately positioned itself in open 
conflict with other members of the region.”84 More extreme anti-Castro delegates at 
Punta del Este made the case less subtly. Guatemala’s Foreign Minister, Jose García 
Bauer, representing President Miguel Ydígoras Fuente’s conservative government, 
proclaimed the existence of a Communist state in the Americas went against nature: 
“it is like trying to mix water and oil; night and day; liberty and tyranny.”85  
The foreign ministers seemed to be suggesting that Castro had somehow 
plucked the island out of the Caribbean and geographically moved it elsewhere. They 
therefore agreed by twenty votes to one (Cuba opposed) that the island no longer 
fitted within the inter-American system. Reflecting on this vote, the Peruvian Foreign 
Minister insisted Punta del Este had demonstrated the “solidity” of the inter-American 
system; “on all essential questions” he declared, “there was unanimous agreement.”86 
Fidel Castro certainly took note of this fact, privately lamenting that “not a single 
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country had a friendly attitude” at the conference.87  
However, agreeing on the Cuban revolution’s “incompatibility” was one thing. 
Deciding what to do about it was another. As had been the case in San José, a number 
of concerns complicated agreement. In addition to domestic constraints, the inter-
American system’s commitment to non-intervention and different interpretations of 
the legal frameworks that existed to manage hemispheric security were key. 
Moreover, questions were raised about the efficacy of sanctions. Together, these 
issues contributed to what Chile’s Foreign Minister called the “profusion of 
contradictory ideas” at the meeting.88  
Ultimately, delegates split into three groups: those that wanted to apply 
comprehensive sanctions against Cuba (Central America, the Dominican Republic, 
Paraguay, and Peru); those that were against them because they did not see any legal 
premise under the Rio Treaty for imposing them or for excluding Cuba from the inter-
American system (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and, 
opportunistically, Haiti); and those that were prepared to drop the idea of sanctions 
but wanted some practicable action to reflect Cuba’s incompatibility with the system 
such as excluding Cuba from the OAS (the United States and Colombia).89 Those 
calling for sanctions made their case loudly. As Carlos Martínez Sotomayor, Chile’s 
new young centrist Foreign Minister (since September 1961), who tried to broker an 
agreement at the Meeting, reported home, the Central Americans’ “intransigence” on 
the issue was so extreme that not even the U.S. delegation shared their position.90  
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Those arguing against sanctions meanwhile did so on legalistic grounds and 
on the basis of their purpose. Tello, for example, rejected the idea that there was any 
proven threat to hemispheric peace or territorial integrity of any member state, 
meaning that the TIAR could not be evoked to apply punitive measures. On the other 
hand, Tello had privately told the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City, Thomas Mann, 
earlier that year that any action against Cuba would only “strengthen the Cuban 
government and pro-Communist groups” in Latin America. Sanctions–despite 
whatever psychological value the United States attached to them–were also likely to 
increase Soviet bloc assistance to Cuba rather than reduce it.91 Brazilian and 
Uruguayan ministers additionally voiced their own opposition to sanctions on the 
grounds they would be, in San Tiago Dantas’ words, “unfruitful, and in the worst 
case, counterproductive.”92 As Uruguay’s Martínez Montero noted, thirteen American 
states (the United States, all Central American states, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, and Venezuela) had already broken relations with Cuba, 
which undermined the impact diplomatic sanctions would have and, if carried out, 
would remove all possibility of offering Cubans asylum from Castro’s regime. 
Because 85 percent of Cuba’s trade by early 1962 was conducted with Communist 
countries, economic sanctions would also have little effect. Moreover, Uruguay’s 
foreign minister noted that, given regional differences, a vote on sanctions would 
“seriously affect the unity of the inter-American system, weakening, rather than 
strengthening, its collective security.”93 
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Because of this opposition, sanctions were removed from the meeting’s 
agenda. However, delegates voted seventeen to one (Cuba) with three abstentions 
(Brazil, Mexico, and Ecuador) for an arms embargo against the island and with a two-
thirds majority to exclude Cuba’s government from the OAS with six abstentions 
(Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador).94 Even so, this decision 
came at a cost. To reach a two-thirds majority, the U.S. delegation had been forced to 
offer Haiti substantial economic aid.95 Individual governments also faced concrete 
domestic political costs as a result of their position at the meeting. Most dramatically, 
Frondizi was overthrown by a military coup d’état the following month in part 
because his government had not taken a harder line against Cuba. Shortly before his 
overthrow, military generals had forced him, almost with a “pistol [pointed] at his 
head,” to break diplomatic relations with the island.96 Directly in response to Punta 
del Este, Fidel Castro issued his most explicit pledge to date to “make revolution” in 
Latin America in what became known as the Second Declaration of Havana.97  
 
The Cuban Question and the Cuban Missile Crisis 
With Castro increasingly committed to supporting revolution in the region and the 
relationship between Havana and the Soviet bloc growing closer, the centrality of the 
Cuban question for the inter-American system grew more acute during 1962. The 
region had plenty of warning in the region that some sort of showdown was looming. 
In July, August, and September 1962, Mexican and Chilean ambassadors in Havana 
warned of growing U.S.-Cuban tensions on the border of the U.S. military base in 
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Guantanamo.98 Counterrevolutionary bands and skirmishes appeared to be rising in 
Cuba and the number of asylum cases grew as Castro’s opponents sought exile in 
Latin American embassies.99  
Meanwhile, in early September 1962, Edwards Bello reported that there had 
been a noticeable increase in people, goods, soldiers, and arms arriving in Cuba. He 
bemoaned the Soviet bloc’s ability to reach Latin Americans who visited the island: 
“Indoctrination is being perfected,” he warned, with “hundreds of emissaries from 
Iron Curtain Communist parties” in Havana giving “instructions to thousands of Latin 
Americans who visit Cuba.” Ominously, he also warned ten Soviet ships were on 
their way to Cuba with “unspecified cargos.”100 In early October, with Edwards Bello 
apparently away from his post, another Chilean embassy official reported that at least 
7,000 Soviet troops were on the island. While he surmised that Soviet weapons being 
erected by Soviet technicians did not appear aimed at “armed aggression,” he 
underlined that “Communist infiltration” remained a serious problem in Latin 
America. Attending a major rally held by the Cuban government in late September 
1962, he also appears to have been particularly struck by the sight of 30,000 “sincere 
and convinced communists” singing the Internationale. It was “an electrifying and 
breath-taking spectacle,” he reported.101  
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Chilean diplomats were not the only ones to comment on the growing 
Communist and Soviet presence in Cuba in late 1962. In early September, 
Guatemala’s ambassador in Rio de Janeiro tried unsuccessfully to persuade the 
Brazilians to support a call for a formal new inter-American meeting to discuss “the 
arrival of arms and . . . Russian troops” in Cuba. As Afonso Arinos, Brazil’s former 
foreign minister and senior diplomat at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, told Uruguay’s 
ambassador after this meeting, more proof of what had arrived and its importance was 
needed before a meeting could be convoked. In a conversation with Colombia’s 
ambassador, Arinos also reportedly stated that he was only aware of “technicians” 
having arrived in Cuba. To Chile’s ambassador, Arinos meanwhile stated that another 
divided inter-American session on Cuba would be “catastrophic” for the 
hemisphere.102 Even so, Latin American Foreign Ministers ultimately met informally 
in Washington on 2-3 October 1962, “to consider the increasing seriousness of the 
Cuban situation particularly in the light of a Soviet arms buildup.” The result was an 
agreement to undertake “special studies . . . urgently on the transfer of funds to other 
American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda and 
the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques.”103 Ultimately, 
however, the declaration’s belligerence did not alter Punta del Este’s resolutions. 
Foreign ministers also noted the significance of the principle of non-intervention and 
Chile’s Foreign Minister Martínez Sotomayor argued the inter-American system 
would need sufficient cause to intervene further.104  
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Then, following Kennedy’s announcement regarding the discovery of Soviet 
short-and medium-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Cuba on 22 
October, Latin American governments were called on to respond. Vindicated, 
Guatemala’s president hit back. The “moment has arrived when they will believe us,” 
he proclaimed immediately after the announcement. Kennedy’s speech had 
demonstrated “that the giant finally woke up and that it will abandon its paralysis and 
lack of foresight.”105 In private, the U.S. ambassador in Guatemala City reported that 
government officials were arguing “now is [the] time [to] act despite any dangers [of] 
global conflagration which probably would increase later anyway if [the] threat [was] 
not ended now.”106 The (inaccurate) impression from the most ardent anti-Cuban 
governments in the region was that the United States had been doing nothing about 
Castro and it was now the chance to act. As Keller has argued, Nicaragua’s dictator, 
Luis Somoza Debayle was on the “warpath” and highly critical of Washington. “If the 
United States does not accompany us in the liquidation of Castro, Latin America will 
see this business through to the end,” Somoza proclaimed.107 However, it was not just 
right-wing anti-Communists who responded to the crisis as a wake-up call. The 
Dominican Republic’s democratically elected president, Juan Bosch, declared it 
finally proved Cuba was an “imminent danger to peace.”108 
When the OAS Council met at a special session on 23 October, all Latin 
American governments subsequently demanded the missiles’ withdrawal. The 
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majority of Latin American states also took direct action. President João Goulart 
ordered Brazil’s air force to prevent the Soviets flying cargo to Havana via Brazil. 
Argentina and the Dominican Republic provided naval units to support U.S. navy 
operations. Following a coup d’état against Frondizi in March 1962, Argentina’s 
position had shifted firmly in favor of the United States and different branches of the 
country’s armed forces now competed to offer Washington military support. 
Governments in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, 
Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador pledged assistance in 
imposing the quarantine and made their territories available to the U.S. should they be 
needed. At the same time, domestic politics across the region grew tense. In 
Venezuela, President Betancourt ordered full-scale mobilization of the country’s 
armed forces, in part to control domestic upheaval generated by the Crisis that 
included armed attacks on U.S. targets and an electrical plant. In Mexico, Bolivia, 
Argentina, and Brazil, too, police and military forces were called on to contain 
demonstrations and protect key infrastructure.109  
Paradoxically, at an inter-American level, the resolution of the crisis only 
exacerbated the growing sense of urgency that Cuba generated. Latin American 
governments that had long-since been arguing for punitive action against Cuba were 
angry Castro was still in power. Caribbean states would have preferred “the invasion 
of Cuba and the overthrow of Castro’s regime” as part of the resolution of the crisis, 
Argentina’s ambassador in Washington reflected.110 Facing an insurgency in 
Venezuela, Betancourt complained that “Cuba, before transforming into a Soviet 
atomic base, was already exporting slogans, money and weapons to . . . destroy 
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democratic American regimes.”111 Now, as the Venezuelan ambassador protested, the 
United States and Latin American countries guaranteed the Cuban revolutionary 
regime’s existence despite its intervention in the region.112  
Kennedy’s pledge not to invade the island in return for Khrushchev removing 
the missiles appeared to many Latin American governments to have left Cuba more 
dangerous than ever before.113 Latin American diplomats at the United Nations were 
reported as being “anxious” for news of what the United States would now do to 
resolve the Cuban problem. As Washington’s UN ambassador, Adlai Stevenson, 
reported to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, requests for clarity and action meant that 
the “stakes and importance [of] making [the] right decision on next step” had risen 
substantially.114 When U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs 
Edwin Martin met the region’s ambassadors in Washington on 13 November, he 
listened to Latin American “preoccupation over [the] continuing threat” Castro posed 
and calls for further action. According to U.S. and Mexican reports of the meeting, 
ambassadors from Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic challenged the idea that 
Castro without “rockets” was “no longer a danger,” arguing “communist penetration 
is the most deadly of its weapons.” Meanwhile, Guatemala’s ambassador raised the 
alarm that preparations were rumored to be underway to readmit Cuba into the OAS. 
As the Mexican Ambassador at the Organization reported, these governments “will 
not be satisfied while the United States, directly or indirectly, does not overthrow the 
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Cuban regime.” In response, Martin and Secretary of State Dean Rusk found 
themselves on the defensive, reassuring representatives that there was “no basis for 
[Cuba’s] return to [the] OAS” as long as it kept up its subversive actions in the 
hemisphere.115 However, “trying to find a way of pleasing [the U.S.’] most dedicated 
allies” was not easy. “The violent reaction to any suggestion that the Cuban people 
are the only competent ones to resolve this problem,” Mexico’s ambassador reported, 
“is . . . symptomatic of the current mood.”116 
In a secret session of the OAS Council in January 1963, Adlai Stevenson was 
able to confirm that missiles and Il-28 bombers were leaving Cuba but admitted 
permission to verify this or guarantee arms would not be reintroduced had not been 
obtained. Many Latin American representatives refused to be mollified by these 
reassurances, this time raising concerns about continued presence of Soviet troops on 
the island. As Venezuela’s representative argued, Cuba was being left alone, “fiercely 
armed . . . and committing all sorts of subversive acts.” Stevenson replied that troops 
had not been included in the agreement with Khrushchev. Although he estimated that 
at least one of 21 thousand troops had withdrawn from Cuba, he could offer little 
more reassurance. When Argentina’s ambassador asked if Soviet “propagation of 
Communism” would continue, Assistant Secretary Martin, who was also at the 
meeting, answered that there were no signs it was likely to decrease; he then added, 
“the problem of Cuba and its relations with American countries” needed to be 
resolved by the OAS Council.117  
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Meanwhile, Kennedy’s non-invasion pledge meant the U.S. held hardline 
governments and Cuban exiles back from further action against Castro, much to their 
chagrin. Although unilaterally involved in various actions against Castro under 
Operation Mongoose, the Kennedy administration was fearful that an invasion of the 
island would lead to another serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As Chile’s 
ambassador in Washington reported home in May 1963, “ultimately, no one wants a 
war . . . over the Cuban Question.”118 “The only efficient way [of removing Castro]” a 
Chilean Foreign Ministry report observed, “would be a U.S. invasion of Cuba and this 
would lead to armed Soviet intervention, with the consequence that [Latin] American 
countries would be forced to take part in a profoundly unpopular war whose results 
and consequences are unpredictable.”119 
  The Cuban question therefore hung heavy over inter-American affairs into 
1963, with member states divided between those who wanted to do something to 
increase pressure on Castro and an important minority who feared the consequences 
of doing so. U.S. officials meanwhile sat uncomfortably in between, apparently 
unable to reassure their most steadfast Cold War allies that they had a solution to the 
Cuban problem. When the OAS Council met with U.S. Undersecretary of State for 
Political Affairs, Alexis Johnson, in June 1963, he underlined that the United States 
position was “not coexistence.”120 Quoting from testimony by Edwin Martin to the 
Senate Sub-committee on Refugees and Escapees on 22 May, Johnson stated 
unequivocally:  
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We want to get rid of Castro and Communist influence in Cuba. [U.S. 
policy] is not passive. We are engaged in a variety of measures, 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral, which are designed to increase the 
isolation of Castro; to increase his serious economic difficulties; to 
prevent by military means, if necessary, any export of aggression from 
Cuba; to thwart Cuban-based and supported subversion of Latin 
American governments; to increase the costs to the Soviets of their 
maintenance of Castro; to persuade the Soviets that they are backing a 
losing and expensive horse; to effect the withdrawal of Soviet military 
forces in Cuba; and to maintain surveillance of Cuba to ensure that it 
does not again become a military threat to the United States or its 
allies in the Hemisphere.121  
 
Despite these reassurances, Argentina’s ambassador asked Johnson what the OAS 
could do to intervene against Castro. Johnson responded that the U.S. government 
“did not have in mind any proposal that the Organization of American States could 
intervene in.” As he told Latin American representatives, he also did not think Cuban 
exile groups were the answer to the Cuban problem: opposition would have to come 
from within Cuba with exiles supporting “their compatriots on the island.” For now, 
he said, the United States would continue to “consult” Latin American governments 
and notify them “at such time as we think further action on [a] hemispheric basis 
might be useful.”122 
 
The Path to Sanctions 
Five months later, the situation changed when proof of Cuban intervention was 
presented to the OAS. Following the discovery of a three-ton arms cache in the 
Paraguaná Peninsula on 1 November 1963, the Venezuelan government called for 
action. Within days, government officials had traced the arms to Cuba, proving 
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Havana’s aggressive policy towards Venezuela.123 It may well be that the CIA planted 
this arms cache. Philip Agee certainly believed it to be the work of the agency’s 
Caracas Station or a joint U.S.-Venezuelan intelligence operation.124 Although Castro 
acknowledged that the Cubans provided moral support, “sympathy,” guerrilla 
training, radio broadcasts, and a location for Venezuelan revolutionaries to retreat to, 
he denied sending arms to guerrillas in Venezuela.125 However, Jonathan Brown’s 
research in newly opened Cuban archives suggests that Cuban diplomats themselves 
accepted the arms cache came from the island.126 A recently declassified internal CIA 
memorandum also refers to “incontrovertible evidence” that weapons came from 
Cuba.127  
Whatever the case, the repercussions of the discovery were important, 
bringing lingering questions about Cuba to a head. The Betancourt administration 
asked the OAS Council to convoke a Meeting of Consultation in line with Article 6 of 
the Rio Treaty to consider sanctions against states that practiced aggression affecting 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Meeting in late November, on the eve of 
Venezuela’s presidential election, the OAS Council agreed to form an investigating 
commission comprising representatives from Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, and the United States.128 A report subsequently published on 24 February 
1964 confirmed Venezuela had been an “object of acts sponsored and directed by the 
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Cuban government, aimed at subverting its institutions.” The report put this in a 
broader context, namely Cuba’s “policy of intervention in the continent with methods 
of propaganda, financing, sabotage and guerrilla training, and the provision of 
arms.”129  
Following the report, OAS members agreed to convene a Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers on 21 July in Washington. U.S. State Department officials welcomed a 
pause until July, believing, it allowed wide dissemination of the report’s findings to 
prepare the ground for punitive measures against Cuba. Pushing for OAS sanctions 
amounted to “shoring up and extension” of a pre-existing “isolation policy” rather 
than a decisive new venture. However, U.S. officials hoped they could insert a 
“juridical umbrella for use of force in future” against Cuba into the resolution by 
classifying subversion as aggression. By imposing comprehensive sanctions, the 
Johnson administration also hoped the OAS would achieve “at a minimum, a delay in 
upswing of Cuban economy;” “increased burden . . . on the Soviets;” and “further 
political isolation” to “psychologically . . . wound Castro deeply.”130 
By early 1964, five countries (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia) 
still had relations with the island. To obtain a majority in favor of sanctions prior to 
the Foreign Minister’s Meeting, the Johnson administration helped Raúl Leoni’s 
incoming administration in Venezuela (who had been eleced in Venezuela on 1 
December 1963 and assumed power in March 1964) to prepare a resolution and 
encouraged it to consult other regional governments.131 With Latin Americans 
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historically resentful about U.S. intervention, the Johnson administration was keen for 
Venezuelans to take the lead, which they did enthusiastically.132 By May, however, 
the U.S.-Venezuelan resolution still faced obstacles.133 In particular, the inclusion of a 
U.S.-designed article giving hemispheric states the right to act if similar proof of 
Cuban intervention was discovered as contentious. As one Chilean Foreign Ministry 
official noted, this was “blank check” and an “unacceptable” precedent for 
interventionism.134 Moreover, in Santiago’s view, the resolution lacked “appropriate 
coordination between its premise and conclusions,” faced “easy legal objections,” and 
was “too drastic.”135 
Secretary of State Rusk therefore suggested Johnson approve a “milder 
alternative” that removed the “blank check” article and proposed sanctions as 
recommendations rather than obligations.136 With this amendment in place, 
Washington was confident it could gain a majority, and possibly even bring Mexico 
on side. The military coup d’état in Brazil that toppled Goulart’s government brought 
an anti-Communist dictatorship to power on 1 April 1964, thus not only removing a a 
powerful opponent to sanctions but also signaling a new counterrevolutionary 
direction for the Southern Cone and a shift in the Cold War’s dynamics within the 
Americas. The Brazilian government formally broke relations Havana in mid-May 
1964, thus underscoring the Brazilian coup’s impact on the hemispheric balance of 
power–and the Cuban question.  
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Even so, the problem with the State Department’s “milder alternative” was 
Venezuela. Although Venezuela was thought to be a mere tool of U.S. policy, 
Venezuela’s foreign minister stridently opposed making sanctions mere 
recommendations. As he told Mann, Johnson’s new assistant secretary of state for 
Latin American affairs, the issue was a “a serious domestic problem” and the future of 
Leoni’s administration was at stake.137 Counting on strong support from eleven 
hardline OAS members, Venezuela was also confident of gaining a majority. The 
Venezuelans thus acted much like the Central Americans had done at Punta del Este 
in putting forward an intransigent position.138 Leoni also dispatched envoys to 
Uruguay, Chile prior to the Washington meeting to pressure their governments to 
support sanctions.139 Rusk, after meeting Leoni, eventually backed down and agreed 
to revert to a resolution that required member states to impose sanctions rather than 
recommend them to.140 
Ultimately, delegates at the meeting in Washington were asked to consider a 
resolution presented by Venezuela, the United States, Peru, and Colombia (the latter 
two joined preparations in July) to suspend all trade with Cuba, impose diplomatic 
sanctions, classify subversion as armed aggression, and help enforce an economic 
blockade against Cuba through pressure on non-abiding European states. Delegates 
quickly settled into three groups: firm “sancionistas,” those against sanctions 
(Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia), and those that were undecided (Argentina, 
Brazil, and Peru. Venezuela could not vote).141 
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Those in favor of sanctions therefore had to work hard yet again to assemble a 
two-thirds majority (fourteen). As Venezuela’s foreign minister urged his 
contemporaries, “nothing will be achieved” without the imposition of collective 
sanctions.142 Mann and Rusk approached Uruguay’s new Foreign Minister, Zorrilla de 
San Martín, to pressure him to change his position. As Mann explained, with 
Republican Barry Goldwater running against Johnson in the U.S. presidential 
elections later that year, an OAS impasse “would be interpreted and exploited as a 
failure of the current administration’s policy.”143 As Zorilla de San Martin reported, 
Rusk meanwhile described the “presence of Cuban diplomatic missions in [Latin] 
America… as ‘a cancer’…used to disseminate propaganda, advance subversion.” 
Increasing Castro’s isolation, he added, could “finish” his regime.144  
Bolivian, Uruguayan, Chilean, and Mexican governments nevertheless stood 
firm against sanctions and other aspects of the resolution that appeared to change the 
inter-American system’s institutional architecture. True, these countries’ diplomats 
agreed to condemn Cuba for aggression against Venezuela, reaffirm Punta del Este’s 
conclusions, and take action to stop Cuban infiltration and subversion. However, there 
were significant reasons for opposing any further action. As Field has found, domestic 
concerns were key for President Paz in Bolivia. Already facing mounting opposition 
to his government, he feared that a break with Cuba would “radicalize leftist 
opposition” who would regard him as a “traitor to revolutionary principles . . . a 
puppet of the U.S.”145 Meanwhile, Uruguay’s Foreign Ministry argued that continued 
diplomatic relations helped to “neutralize” dangerous elements in international 
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relations. Cuba’s embassy in Montevideo and Uruguay’s embassy in Havana did not 
act as a base for propagating ideology or subversion and closing the four remaining 
Latin American embassies in Havana, “would end . . . political support for the 
[Cuban] opposition” while removing “a source of direct and reliable information” 
about the island. Montevideo’s diplomats also argued sanctions “lacked realism.”146 
Whatever the State Department believed, they predicted Mexico would not break 
relations with Cuba. They also reasoned that support for Cuba inside Chile, along 
with the country’s forthcoming presidential elections, in which the left-wing coalition 
led by Salvador Allende was predicted to do well, made it unlikely that President 
Jorge Alessandri’s outgoing conservative government would vote for sanctions. 
Moreover, as Chile’s new Foreign Minister, Jorge Philippi, underlined, Latin America 
accounted for one percent of all Cuban trade, so economic sanctions would be 
ineffective.147 Finally, Zorrilla de San Martín openly told delegates he was worried 
about the “precedent” that classifying subversion as “aggression” could have: it could 
be “exploited against the sacred and legitimate struggle of populations against 
oppression and tyranny.” “If we want to sincerely eliminate diplomatic missions for 
fear they could be permanent centers of infiltration and support for subversion,” he 
added, “the measure should extend to the whole Communist world and not just 
Cuba.”148  
The Chilean Foreign Ministry similarly argued there was no proof the four 
countries that had diplomatic relations with Cuba had contributed to that country’s 
intervention in Venezuela. Even if Chile was prepared to condemn Cuban aggression 
and increase hemispheric surveillance and vigilance, classifying subversion as 
aggression was “unacceptable” as it meant “modifying the Rio Treaty, which cannot 
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be done without another treaty.”149 Meanwhile, U.S. observers described Mexico’s 
delegation as being “bitter about the possibility of being forced to suspend relations 
and air service. They regard this move as a sanction against Mexico, not Cuba.”150 
However, the issue went beyond trade. As Mexico’s representative told the 
conference,151 he had serious doubts Venezuela’s territorial integrity had been 
violated in line with Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. Six months after arms were 
discovered, the country’s government was in control and at no point had the continent 
been in danger.152 
Despite tese arguments, the four countries lost the argument when the 
Brazilian, Argentine, and Peruvian delegations decided to vote in favor of the 
resolution.153 Although Mexican, Uruguayan, Chilean, and Bolivian representatives 
unsuccessfully tried to modify it and then abstained from the vote, the resolution to 
impose collective diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba passed by15 
votes.154  
Whether the four abstaining countries would abide by this vote was not clear. 
Mexico never did. This decision had been sanctioned at the last minute by a secret 
U.S.-Brazilian-Mexican deal, apparently because (as Zorrilla de San Martín had 
argued) retaomomg one Latin American embassy in Havana open could prove useful 
once all others closed.155 The futures of the Uruguayan, Chilean, and Bolivian 
embassies in Cuba were nevertheless still in the air after the meeting. When Chile’s 
outgoing administration announced its decision to break relations with Cuba and 
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impose sanctions two weeks later this came as a surprise. With a large sector of the 
population against the move either on centrist grounds of non-intervention or left-
wing sympathy for Castro, the Chilean foreign minister had assured his Uruguayan 
counterpart that Santiago would stand firm.156 Then, on 11 August, less than a month 
before the Chilean elections, the country’s outgoing President, Jorge Alessandri, made 
a sudden, personal decision to break relations. According to the explanation Chile’s 
Foreign Minister offered his Uruguayan counterpart, Alessandri made the decision 
after a 90-minute meeting with representatives of the left-wing coalition that Allende 
was standing for who had visited him to try and persuade him not to break relations. 
The concerns this meeting raised regarding Cuba’s influence in Chile, and his fear of 
Chile being isolated in the inter-American system, meant that he did not want to leave 
the Cuban question to his successor.157 After Chile’s decision, facing “unremitting” 
pressure from the United States along with other hemispheric powers, Bolivia and 
Uruguay quickly followed suit, with Montevideo being the last to break relations with 
Cuba in early September.158 As Field reveals, after Chile’s decision to break relations, 
Bolivia’s President Paz had told his ministers “the alternative . . . would be to 
disavow the Rio Treaty, isolating ourselves in the Latin American community, and 
losing U.S. aid.”159 And yet, as predicted by Paz, the Bolivian left subsequently came 
out openly against him as an “agent of Yankee imperialism” adding to the mounting 
pressure against his government and creating the conditions for a coup d’état that 
overthrew him in November 1964.160 
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By the end of 1964, with the exception of Mexico’s calculated stance, Cuba 
was formally isolated in the Americas. As those who resisted sanctions had predicted, 
this did not economically endanger Castro’s position. Castro’s regime survived, 
continued to sponsor revolution abroad, and attract support from Latin American 
populations. Cuba’s isolation meanwhile arguably boosted local actors who viewed 
Castro sympathetically and fought against their governments to change their approach 
to the island. Reestablishing relations with Cuba and ending economic sanctions 
henceforth became a rallying cry for those opposed to U.S. intervention in Latin 
America. The problem for those campaigning to overturn sanctions is that it was not 
just the United States that they had to convince. Governing elites and diplomats also 
held strong views. In the mid-to-late 1960s, with Cuba no longer part of the OAS and 
collective sanctions imposed, the Cuban question therefore shifted more than ever to 
internal, domestic arenas, where it determined the course of an acute new phase of the 
Cold War, one that was fought within countries.  
 
Conclusion  
The 1959 revolution did not result in an overnight change to Cuba’s position in the 
inter-American system. Latin American states did not act together as one regional 
unit, even if they often collaborated in smaller groups. They argued about how to 
react to Cuba even if they agreed on the threat Havana’s revolutionary government 
represented for the region. The road to sanctions was long and problematic because 
the Cuban question intersected with domestic preoccupations, fundamental principles 
governing the inter-American system’s post-war architecture, and questions regarding 
the efficacy of sanctions. As diplomats adjusted to the global Cold War’s new 
intrusion into hemispheric affairs, the Cuban question became increasingly perceived 
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as a measure of the inter-American system’s legal underpinnings, character, and 
framework. Leaders seemed impelled to define themselves, each other, and the inter-
American system in relation to the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban question also 
brought Latin America’s identity into focus. As diplomats at Punta del Este 
suggested, geography and colonial experiences were no longer enough to qualify a 
country and its government as “Latin American.”  Ideology and extra-continental 
relationships also mattered, having the power to disqualify states from the Americas, 
a message long-since promoted by the United States. From the time of the Monroe 
Doctrine, Washington’s diplomats had called for excluding all non-hemispheric 
influences from the Western Hemisphere. The OAS Charter had included reference to 
the Cold War and the need to exclude Communism from the hemisphere. However, 
recently declassified Latin American documents illustrate these ideas about the pre-
requisites for inclusion in the inter-American system were also strongly held within 
the region. At least among political elites in the early 1960s, the fight against 
Communism and fear of Soviet intrusion into the hemisphere mattered. This is 
unsurprising given Cuba threatened domestic political balances of power by 
mobilizing groups demanding radical change. The political and diplomatic elites who 
governed international affairs in the Latin America during the 1960s–and the history 
of anti-Communism in the region going back to the 1920s and 1930s–nevertheless 
need more attention lest we mistakenly relegate them to mere supporting roles in the 
history of the Cold War.  
The notion of a U.S. vs. Latin American binary story of Washington telling 
regional partners what to do and them resisting such instructions also needs to be 
challenged. All governments in the hemisphere were broadly on the same side of the 
Cuban question and the Cold War, even though the vehemence of some states 
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reminds us to explore the different shades of anti-Communism that existed in the 
hemisphere. Important as the United States was, it does not appear to have been the 
only driver of hemispheric policy toward Cuba. Nor was it able to control the way the 
Cuba question played out – at least not to the extent the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson administrations would have liked. To the contrary, particularly after the 
Cuban missile crisis, it was often on the back foot of more strident calls to do 
something about Castro. Only by placing U.S. Cold War policies towards Cuba in an 
inter-American context can we begin to evaluate the significance and specificity of 
Washington’s role in the hemisphere. At key moments, U.S. diplomacy and covert 
intervention were able to keep momentum going against Cuba and affected the 
calculations that regional governments made. However, others were pushing–often 
more aggressively–for intervention. Anti-Communism and hostile reactions to the 
Cuban Revolution were explicit and abundant in Latin America as well as the United 
States, and to understand the Cold War in the region we must take them seriously.  
What is perhaps most surprising is how important the Soviet Union and its 
involvement in Cuba were deemed to be by Latin American political elites. Although 
we now know that the USSR was not hell-bent to spread revolution in the region–and 
that the Cubans and Soviets argued bitterly about this–recently declassified 
documents show the Soviet Union was an important ingredient in regional diplomats’ 
calculations. The USSR’s significance–and the threat of international Communism–
was not so much direct as indirect: it was imagined, exaggerated, and perceived as 
being more relevant than it was. The Cuban question, spanning the five years between 
1959 and 1964, nevertheless crystallized this threat and brought it into focus. And in 
doing so, it brought the global Cold War to the region in a way that it had not been 
present before. In what would be a new violent chapter of the region’s history, this 
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conflict, in turn, was subsequently internalized, Latin Americanized, and bitterly 
fought out within the region. At the heart of ideological divides within different 
countries that followed were sharp disagreements over Cuba, its example, its role in 
supporting revolutionary activity in the hemisphere, and what it meant for the region’s 
relationship with the rest of the world. There is still much to be learned about the 
Cuban question and its disruptive impact in Latin America both at a state and a non-
state level. My hope is that this article contributes to scholarship that is shifting 
narratives away from an exclusive discussion of the United States plus Latin America 
by delineating multilateral patterns within the region and how these then intersected 
with U.S. policy goals.  
 
